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Abstract





The international law governing self-defence is notoriously controversial.  Since the inception of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, numerous bothersome issues as to the scope, nature and content of the right have continued to plague States and scholars alike.  For example, in recent years, the long-standing debate over whether Article 51 of the UN Charter allows for self-defence in response to a threat – rather than an actual use – of force has been given a thorough dusting off following the atrocities of 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’.​[1]​  The flames of this debate were fanned most notably by the controversial ‘Bush Doctrine’ of pre-emptive self-defence​[2]​ (being, in simple terms, self-defence in response not just to a threat, but to a potential or a temporally remote threat).​[3]​  Another current academic hot potato is the question of whether self-defence may be taken in response to the actions of non-State actors, or whether international law requires some degree of State complicity in the attack being responded to: something that remains unclear.​[4]​  General State condonation of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, and support for its lawfulness as a self-defence action​[5]​ suggests one conclusion to this question.  Conversely, the statement of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2004 that self-defence requires an attack ‘by one State against another State’​[6]​ indicates a wholly inverse position.

This article does not revisit such well trodden ground, but instead focuses upon a comparatively overlooked issue with regard to the scope of self-defence in international law.  The issue in question here is whether the subjective ‘psychological’ positions of the States involved in a dispute concerning the use of force have any impact upon the lawfulness of an action avowedly taken in self-defence.  What follows is an examination of the impact that the ‘intention’ or ‘motivation’ of the States involved in a forcible dispute has, if anything, upon the lawfulness of a self-defence action.  Is there an additional legal criterion of ‘good faith’ under the jus ad bellum concerning self-defence,​[7]​ or is the regulation of that right a comparatively objective aspect of international law?

It has been suggested, in both international law literature and in the judgments of the ICJ, that the intention or motive of either the State responding to an attack against it, or the State that did the original attacking, may be relevant to the ultimate lawfulness of the response taken.  With respect to the State responding in self-defence, there is a long standing but rarely explored conception that the State’s motives for responding are relevant to the lawfulness of the response.  The purity (or impurity) of a State’s motive forms the basis of a distinction for many writers between a potentially lawful self-defence action and a clearly unlawful ‘armed reprisal’.  For a number of reasons, it is important that this distinction, which has at times been automatically accepted, is scrutinised.  Concerns were raised with regard to it in the 1970s in an important article by Derek Bowett.​[8]​  However, the matter has been little considered since then.  Given much of the current uncertainty surrounding self-defence and the law governing the use of force more generally, it is necessary for the question of ‘armed reprisals’ to be revisited, specifically with regard to the notion that they are defined through an assessment of State motivation.

In addition to the position of the responding State, it is also possible that the subjective intention of the attacking State may be relevant to the question of whether the attack perpetrated by that State constitutes an ‘armed attack’, and thus can trigger the right of self-defence.  This notion that the ‘psychological’ position of the attacking State is relevant to the lawfulness of avowed self-defence actions has arisen in the jurisprudence of the ICJ.  It is not something that has transferred from the judgments emerging from the Peace Palace to the pages of scholarly writings on self-defence.  However, it nonetheless requires examination here.

With regard to both situations, the conclusion is reached that the lawfulness of an avowed self-defence action should be, and, indeed, is, premised upon objective criteria alone.  The subjective ‘psychological’ positions of States have no place in the final analysis of whether an action was lawful or unlawful.  Indeed, reference to intention or motive in this context has the potential to further muddy the already rather murky waters of the law governing self-defence.  The law in this context must be ‘objective’, at least to a certain extent, to ensure some degree of clarity and practical applicability.  This article therefore aims to dispel lingering suggestions that the subjective ‘psychological’ positions of States (intent and motive) are relevant to the lawfulness of an action taken under the inherent right of self-defence.

Before going any further, it should be noted that the concepts of ‘intent’ and ‘motive’ are, in actuality, different things.  This can be demonstrated within the scope of inter-State use of force.  For example, States A and B could both intend to launch a ground force attack against State C, but the motives of States A and B may differ: State A may do so to protect its borders, whilst State B may do so to protect its nationals within State C’s territory.  The notion of ‘intention’ relates to the aim of an action, whereas ‘motive’ relates to the reasons for having that aim.  However, intent and motivation are inherently linked.  Both are subjective ‘psychological’ elements that inform action, and, for the most part, to draw a distinction between them would be somewhat pedantic in the current context.  As such, these terms are treated as broadly synonymous in this article: the crucial issue here is whether there are occasions where an underlying ‘mental element’ – be it the subjective reason for, or the goal behind, a military action – may have a direct normative impact upon a legal claim of self-defence.  Nonetheless, it is worth bearing in mind throughout that the concepts of intention and motivation do not necessarily exactly correspond.

II. The Objective Criteria: Custom and Convention

The accepted criteria for self-defence are well known, albeit that their scope is often debated.  As such, this is not the place to set them out in detail.  Nonetheless, it is useful for us to briefly refer to the basic structure of the law governing self-defence as our starting point.

Self-defence is governed by both treaty and customary international law.  As the ICJ made clear in the first of its merits decisions to deal directly with claims of self-defence, the Nicaragua case:

There can be no doubt that the issues of the use of force and collective self-defence raised in the present proceedings are issues which are regulated both by customary international law and by treaties, in particular by the United Nations Charter.​[9]​

The law deriving from these two sources does not necessarily correspond: the substantive rules on self-defence that have their basis in customary international law are not always identical in content to those contained in multilateral treaties on the subject.​[10]​  Therefore, the UN era system of self-defence essentially represents an amalgamation of the pre-Charter customary international law position and the right as is set out in Article 51 of the Charter.

The crucial element of the pre-Charter customary regime was that for an action in self-defence to be lawful, it must have been both necessary and proportional.  These two criteria stretch well back into international legal theory.​[11]​  However, they appeared on the landscape of ‘modern’ international law with a much-quoted letter of 1842 by the then United States Secretary of State, Daniel Webster.​[12]​  This letter concerned the 1837 sinking of the steamship Caroline in United States territory by British-Canadian forces.  Webster insisted that a State claiming self-defence must:

[S]how a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that…[it] did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.​[13]​  

From this famous statement the concepts of necessity and proportionality can clearly be discerned.  Since the time of the Caroline, these criteria have developed legal content through cumulative State practice and opinio juris.​[14]​  Today, the ‘necessity’ criterion requires that military action must be taken as a ‘last resort’.  In other words, the responding State must show that non-forcible measures were either exhausted, or that the extremity of the situation meant that it would have been wholly unreasonable to expect the responding State to attempt non-forcible measures of resolution.​[15]​  ‘Proportionality’ in general refers to the need for the State to act in a manner that is proportional to the established defensive necessity.  This means that the proportionality criterion is not merely a requirement for a numerical equivalence of scale or means (a ‘like for like’ response, as it were), but rather that the force employed must not be excessive with regard to the goal of abating or repelling the attack being responded to.​[16]​  Neither necessity nor proportionality is mentioned in Article 51.  Nonetheless, it is uncontroversial that they exist as aspects of the contemporary law governing self-defence: it is today accepted by virtually all States and scholars that these customary criteria govern international law.​[17]​
 
In addition to these customary requirements, Article 51 implanted additional criteria for self-defence into international law.​[18]​  For example, it states that measures taken in self-defence must be reported to the Security Council.​[19]​  By far the most important additional aspect of Article 51, however, is that it requires that the State acting in self-defence must have suffered (or, perhaps, as some argue, must be faced with the threat of suffering) an armed attack against it.  The notion of an ‘armed attack’ has, since the adoption of the Charter, been interpreted to mean a qualitatively grave use of force.​[20]​  As the ICJ has put it, an armed attack constitutes ‘the most grave form of the use of force’.​[21]​  Therefore, it is not merely enough for a State to have suffered a use of force against it.  The responding State must have faced an attack of a grave level, beyond that of a use of force simpliciter.

When the treaty-based requirement of an armed attack is coupled with the continuing customary international law criteria we can see that, in somewhat simplistic terms, the lawfulness of a self-defence action is assessed with regard to three primary criteria:

1) Did the responding State suffer a grave use of force (armed attack)?
2) Was the response to that grave use of force a last resort (necessity)?
3) Was the force used the minimum required to meet the defensive necessity created by the attack (proportionality)?

If all three questions can be answered in the affirmative, then, broadly speaking, the response will amount to a lawful self-defence action.

Importantly for our discussion, these criteria are all capable of external assessment, and, in this respect, they must be seen as being objective.  States, of course, make their own assessment as to whether to employ force in self-defence, and how to go about employing that force.  A responding State therefore makes an individual assessment as to, for example, whether it is ‘necessary’ to respond with force.  To this extent, the three criteria discussed are subjective: a State acts based upon its own interpretation as to whether the requirements for self-defence have been met.

Whilst all three of the criteria listed are self-assessed in the first instance, ex post facto, this assessment may be, and in many cases will be, examined by external actors, including other States, intergovernmental and nongovernmental bodies and academics.  Admittedly, armed attack, necessity and proportionality are all highly flexible criteria, and can thus be interpreted to reach contradictory conclusions.​[22]​  Given this fact, different actors will, of course, take different subjective positions as to whether the requirements for self-defence have been met in any given instance.  Nonetheless, the three crucial criteria for establishing self-defence are also all based upon empirically demonstrable factors: the nature of the attack and the nature of the response taken.  Thus, whilst interpretations may differ, the criteria themselves are based upon objective standards.

These objective criteria are the starting point for any legal assessment of the lawfulness of a use of force avowedly taken in self-defence.  States, international organisations and scholars all examine claims of self-defence and test them against these objective, albeit flexible, criteria.  However, in the following sections, we shall examine the possibility that, irrespective of these objective criteria being met, an action on self-defence may nonetheless be unlawful, due to the subjective reasons for acting of the States involved.

III. The Responding State: Armed Reprisals and the Question of Pure Motives

(i) Self-Defence and Armed Reprisals

A distinction has often been drawn, particularly in the UN era, between two categories of forcible response.  First, one can identify military actions taken in self-defence.  These constitute lawful forcible responses (providing that they meet the criteria set out in the previous section), despite the fact that they constitute a prima facie breach of the prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  Such lawful self-defence actions can then be distinguished from what are termed ‘armed reprisals’.  Like self-defence actions, armed reprisals are forcible responses to a prior breach of an international legal obligation owed to the responding State.​[23]​  

However, in contrast to a response taken in self-defence, there has been general and continued agreement throughout the UN era that the type of unilateral forcible response termed an ‘armed reprisal’ constitutes a breach of international law.  Thus Bowett opened his renowned article on armed reprisals by stating that ‘few propositions about international law have enjoyed more support than the proposition that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the use of force by way of reprisal is illegal.’​[24]​  More recently, with regard to the ‘war on terror’, Gray has suggested that there is ‘universal agreement that reprisals are not lawful.’​[25]​  This may go slightly too far, but it is certainly true that since the adoption of the UN Charter armed reprisals have been explicitly and repeatedly condemned as being unlawful in State practice.  A classic example of such condemnation is a passage from the 1970 UN Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Co-operation among States, which expressly holds that: ‘States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.’​[26]​  In the context of Security Council practice, several resolutions have labelled armed reprisals as unlawful, either explicitly or implicitly.​[27]​  The most quoted example of this is Security Council resolution 188, in relation to British aerial attacks against Yemen in 1964.  The resolution explicitly condemned ‘reprisals as incompatible with the principles and purposes of the UN.’​[28]​  

Fundamentally, the conclusion that armed reprisals are unlawful stems directly from the fact that the UN Charter prohibits the use of force under Article 2(4).  The only lawful exception to this outside of the framework of UN authorised uses of force is self-defence under Article 51.  Therefore, a unilateral use of force that is not a self-defence action must be prohibited.

As such, despite some scholars taking positions to the contrary,​[29]​ it appears clear that in the context of the jus ad bellum, one may distinguish self-defence (which is a lawful military response to an international delict) and armed reprisals (which are unlawful forcible responses to an international delict).  However, whilst actions of armed reprisals have been repeatedly condemned in State practice as being unlawful, it is unclear from such condemnations what an armed reprisal actually constitutes.  The resolutions of UN bodies that have condemned armed reprisals do not set out what that term means.  The question, then, is what in fact distinguishes an unlawful armed reprisal from a lawful self-defence action?  It is of little use to have universal (or near-universal) agreement as to the unlawful nature of armed reprisals if it is not clear as to what such actions actually amount to, and why they are to been seen as being distinct from self-defence actions.  

Before attempting to answer this question, two points of clarification must be made as to what is being discussed in this context.  First, it is possible to envisage a situation where an armed reprisal could be taken in response to a non-forcible breach of a prior obligation.  In other words, if State A breached a trade obligation owed to State B, and State B responded to this with military force, that response could be termed an armed reprisal.  The distinction between a self-defence action and this kind of armed reprisal (in response to a non-forcible breach) is clear – self-defence can only be taken in response to an actual use (or, perhaps arguably in certain circumstances the threat) of force,​[30]​ and in no other instances.  Armed reprisals following a non-forcible breach against the responding State are patently unlawful.​[31]​  What is more important for our purposes is the distinction between lawful self-defence actions and armed reprisals taken in response to an unlawful use of force directed at the responding State.  Therefore, for the most part, the term ‘armed reprisals’ is used herein to indicate armed reprisals taken in response to a military attack.

Second, it is worth noting that a distinction should be drawn between armed reprisals as discussed in this article and what are often termed ‘belligerent reprisals’ or even ‘belligerent armed reprisals’.  A belligerent reprisal constitutes a response taken in the context of an ongoing armed conflict by a belligerent party to that conflict.  The regulation of such action is governed by the jus in bello, perhaps most notably under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the First Additional Protocol of 1977.​[32]​  Armed reprisals, in contrast, constitute responses to forcible actions taken in peacetime (although it is possible that a situation involving armed reprisals could escalate into one of conflict).  In other words, we are talking about reprisals as governed by the jus ad bellum – forcible actions comparable in form to self-defence.

(ii) A Distinction Based Upon Subjective Factors

Having clarified what we mean by ‘armed reprisals’ in this context, we must return to the question of what distinguishes this type of response from the lawful self-defence variety.  It is here that the responding State’s subjective ‘psychological’ position emerges as a potentially relevant factor.  In the literature, the primary distinguishing feature of an armed reprisal, and the basis of its distinction from a self-defence action, has been the intention or motive of the State responding to an attack against it.​[33]​  As such, there is a long standing, though rarely analysed, conception in international law scholarship that the motive behind a response taken in self-defence has an impact upon the lawfulness of that response.  The assumption is that if the intention of a military response to a prior attack is ‘defensive’, then that response will be one of self-defence.  As such, it will be lawful (again, assuming that other relevant criteria for self-defence listed in Section II are met).  Conversely, if the motive or intention behind the response is retributory or punitive, then the action is an armed reprisal, and is thus unlawful.  Forcible responses taken for punitive reasons are generally given the label ‘armed reprisals’.  Therefore, under this conception, only forcible responses that have ‘pure’ defensive motives are lawful.

To take an example, in the context of the Nazi invasion of Norway, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg appeared to support the idea that the motives behind an action taken in self-defence have a bearing on its lawfulness:

It is clear that when the plans for an attack on Norway were being made they were not made for the purpose of forestalling an imminent Allied landing but, at the most, that they might prevail an allied occupation at some future date.​[34]​

This passage from Nuremberg led Bowett to conclude that use of the phrase ‘purpose’ indicated that the reasons behind an action are determinative as to its lawfulness.  As such, Bowett took the view that the idea of ‘good faith’ in self-defence must be seen as a supplementary requirement to the Caroline formula.​[35]​  Indeed, elsewhere, Bowett has stated that ‘measures not illegal per se may become illegal only upon proof of an improper motive or purpose.’​[36]​

Such a distinction between lawful self-defence on the one hand and unlawful armed reprisals on the other, based upon the underlying intention behind the action, makes a great deal of conceptual sense.  Indeed, linguistically, this distinction is built into the very terms that have over the centuries been employed.  Self-defence must, surely, be defensive in nature.  Similarly, the word ‘reprisal’ clearly indicates the punitive nature of the action.  When the two terms – self-defence and armed reprisals – are compared, it seems rather obvious that they are to be distinguished based upon the intention underlying the response taken.  

Far more significantly, it is undesirable from a policy point of view for States to be able to legally justify retaliatory uses of force.  Such a possibility would clearly be contrary to the very core of the UN system: the peaceful settlement of disputes​[37]​ and the centralisation of the use of force.  Thus, during debates in the Security Council concerning military action by Israel against Lebanon in 1972, the representative of Argentina expressly pointed out that ‘punitive expeditions…are totally incompatible with the purposes, principles and prescriptions of the UN Charter.’​[38]​  Such an assertion must be seen as being correct.

It is therefore hard to dissent from the view that whilst a defensive military measure may in some circumstances be lawful, it is both logical and desirable that forcible measures taken with a punitive intent should be unlawful per se.  However, there are problems with a distinction based upon the mentality or ‘psychological’ position of the responding State.  These stem from the fact that a conceptual difference between a self-defence action and an armed reprisal based upon intent or motive is actually very difficult to establish in practice.

Perhaps most importantly, difficulty arises from the fact that one simply cannot identify the intent of a State at all.  It is almost impossible to ever in fact determine what people ‘believe’ or ‘intend’.​[39]​  This problem is greatly multiplied when one begins to examine the intention of a State.  International law primarily involves the relations between huge abstract entities, with numerous decision-makers influencing policy.  The notion that such an entity can possess a single ‘intention’ or ‘motive’ is a difficult one to maintain.​[40]​  Moreover, even if one argues that a State can posses of itself a ‘psychological’ position on anything, it is apparent that identifying what that intention is would be virtually impossible: the ‘motive or purpose of a State [is] notoriously difficult to elucidate.’​[41]​  Certainly, if the lawfulness of a State’s action relies upon its underlying intentions, a State could not be trusted to assess its own motives or intentions retrospectively: therefore any claims made by States as to its ‘psychological’ position could not be factored into any legal analysis.  

A more realistic and textured approach to identifying intention is of course to place reliance upon inference through conduct.​[42]​  Yet, whilst this is a pragmatic method in comparison to somehow divining a State’s ‘intention’ from the ether, it is still flawed.  In the context of the use of force, it is possible to conceive of some circumstances where an inference of intent through conduct may be possible (if, indeed, one can accept that a State may ‘intend’ anything at all).  If State A attacks State B in a manner that can leave no doubt as to the punitive nature of that action and in circumstances where there is also clearly no possibility that the response was a defensive one, it may legitimately be inferred that the response was not ‘intended’ to be one in self-defence.  However, in the vast majority of cases, the situation will be unclear.  It is not as though the motive behind an action will necessary fall into only one category.  Any reason for acting, especially in highly complex situations like the use of force in international relations, is rarely black and white.  In practice the intention or motive behind the forcible action is likely to be an amalgamation of various factors and viewpoints.  Is there ever, in reality, a State that has been attacked that does not have some degree of punitive intent mixed up with its response?​[43]​  

As an example, let us take the action of the United States’ led coalition in Afghanistan in 2001.  The intervention was undoubtedly in part a defensive measure, aimed at securing against future terrorist attacks.​[44]​  However, it would be difficult to argue that the United States did not ‘intend’ (so far as this concept may be applied to a State) to punish Al-Qaeda – and by extension, Afghanistan – for the events of 9/11.​[45]​  A multiplicity of reasons underpinning such an important action as the use of military force (institutionalised violence on a potentially large scale) is inevitably a ubiquitous feature of State decision making.  As such, basing assessments of lawfulness upon a distinction between autonomous ‘psychological’ positions is, at best, highly impractical:

A doctrinal system that seeks to disentangle retribution from protection, and attach different legal consequences to each, is impossible to apply in the real world.​[46]​

At this juncture it is worth noting that any international lawyer reading the above is likely to be quick to point out that judgments about the ‘psychological’ positions of States are made all of the time in the discipline, in the context of determining the opinio juris element of customary international law.  Opinio juris is traditionally defined as a requirement that States possess a ‘belief’ that a practice is allowed or required by law.​[47]​  In making this traditional assessment – when examining the formation of one of the primary sources of international law – international lawyers regularly make determinations as to the ‘psychological’ positions of States.  Surely, then, it is not problematic to apply a similar standard to the law on the use of force?

Yet, the issue of whether a State can hold a ‘psychological’ position at all, and if so, how such a position could possibly be defined, has been questioned by some scholars with regard to the establishment of customary international law.  A significant minority of writers have pointed out that ‘belief’ on the part of a State is an illusory subjective standard.​[48]​  As such, they raise the same concerns in the context of customary law formation as are here set out in regard to the jus ad bellum.  This is not the place to discuss a theory of customary international law formation, but it should be noted that the present author takes the view that opinio juris in fact constitutes a process of legal claim, counter-claim and response, with widely accepted claims acting to support the actual practice of States in forming the law.​[49]​  Such claims are, it is argued, objective, and do not relate to an erroneous notion of ‘belief’.

The issue of whether a State can ‘believe’ or ‘intend’ anything, and whether such a criterion can be employed with regard to States, has led to limited discussion in relation to customary law formation.  This limited treatment of the issue is even more pronounced in the context of the conception that punitive intent invalidates the lawfulness of a self-defence action.  Irrespective of this lack of analysis, it seems clear that an assessment of the lawfulness of a self-defence claim cannot be made ex post facto if one of the criteria that this is premised upon is the intention of the action.  This is due to the simple fact that the intention of a State, if such a concept is possible at all, is something that cannot in any way be objectively discerned, and even inferring this from empirical action is fraught with difficulty.  As such, reliance on ‘psychological’ factors has direct consequences for both the clarity of the law and for its practical applicability.

Finally, it may also be questioned whether the defensive right of a State should be taken away simply due to the fact that the State is acting with an undesirable motive.  The right of a State to defend itself is famously an ‘inherent’ one,​[50]​ and is a fundamental aspect of both pre and post Charter international law.  If a State meets the objective criteria for self-defence and succeeds in defending itself, it is difficult to argue that motivation should be seen as relevant (irrespective of the fact that it is impossible to ascertain).  This is because the crucial issue that underpins self-defence is a State’s right to respond to a defensive necessity.  Questioning the motives of the State in responding to that necessity would seem to run dangerously close to impinging upon the defensive right.

It may be seen from the above that a distinction between lawful self-defence and unlawful armed reprisals based on a criterion of ‘pure motive’ quickly becomes clouded: ‘the distinction commonly drawn between the customary rights of self-defence and reprisals is, at best, a very tenuous one.’​[51]​

(iii) A Distinction Based Upon Objective Criteria

This is not to say that it is incorrect to conclude that a majority of responses that have a clear punitive element should be held to be – and will be held to be – unlawful.  It has already been noted that there are obvious policy reasons to support this.​[52]​  Moreover, as we have seen, it is clear that armed reprisals are unlawful under modern international law.​[53]​  It is not here argued that this conclusion is incorrect.  Instead, the current author takes the view that the traditional definition of an armed reprisal is flawed.  It is necessary that the distinction between armed reprisals and self-defence be clarified.  In purely legal terms, military actions taken in response to a prior breach of international law are not assessed with regard to some illusory notion of intent, but on the basis of a failure to meet the criteria of armed attack, necessity and proportionality.  

In the first instance, of course, any use of military force that is taken in response to something other than a use of force cannot constitute a lawful action of self-defence.  This is because no armed attack will have occurred (indeed, such an action could hardly be considered necessary or proportional either).  Thus, armed reprisals taken in response to the non-forcible breach of an international obligation are, as was briefly noted above,​[54]​ patently unlawful.   A use of force taken by State B in response to the breach of a trade agreement by State A, for example, would rightly be condemned as an unlawful armed reprisal.  This is true irrespective of the motive of the responding State.  The basis for the unlawfulness of the action is simple: it stems from its failure to meet the objective criteria for self-defence. 

In the more interesting situation of a forcible response to a prior military attack, the question of whether the response taken is an armed reprisal or an action taken in self-defence is again based upon the objective criteria for the establishment of self-defence.  Assuming the action is a response to an armed attack (and not a lower level use of force), the issue is whether the response taken met the criteria of necessity and proportionality.  It is not what the State intended to achieve with the response, or why it decided to embark upon a forcible response.  In other words, an ‘armed reprisal’ is simply a term to indicate a use of force taken in response to an international wrong that does not meet the requirements for self-defence.  

This approach has a far greater level of certainty and practical applicability than one premised upon subjective factors.  It allows for ex post facto assessment of self-defence claims based upon empirical factors.  Nonetheless, in the majority of cases, it will still support the policy-goal of ensuring that the majority of clearly punitive uses of force are prohibited.  For example, a response to a use of force taken a number of years after the initial attack was suffered would constitute an unlawful armed reprisal, even if the initial attack was of a gravity to constitute an armed attack.  Such a response would clearly have been punitive in nature, as there would no longer be any need for the State to defend itself.  However, the response in this case would be unlawful not because of its punitive nature, but because it would no longer be necessary to respond to the attack.  Similarly, a disproportionate response is likely to be ‘characteristic of the will to punish.’​[55]​  Yet it is the disproportionate nature of the action in itself that negates the lawfulness of the response, not any punitive intent that this disproportionality may indicate.  To put all this in another way: a large proportion of actions that would appear to be punitive in nature will fall at the legal stumbling blocks of necessity and proportionality.  

Having said this, it is important for the workability of the law governing self-defence that measures of punitive intent that do meet the criteria for self-defence are awarded the badge of lawfulness, even if this is perhaps politically or morally undesirable.​[56]​  To take another example, if State A attacks a military vessel of State B, it could be that State B intends to respond by overthrowing State A’s government.  It is unlikely that such a response could meet the criteria of proportionality, making it an unlawful armed reprisal not qualifying as self-defence.  However, this intention would be irrelevant if State B did not in fact manage to act in such a manner, but instead initiated a response that was ultimately of a lesser (proportional) gravity, for example due to lack of resources.

Turning to the pronouncements of the ICJ, it is possible to argue that, in the Nicaragua decision, the Court took the view that the motive or intention of the State invoking self-defence should be seen as being irrelevant to a determination of whether that State was acting lawfully: ‘The existence of an additional motive, other than that officially proclaimed by the United States, could not deprive the latter of its right to resort to collective self-defence.’​[57]​  It therefore would appear that it was seen as immaterial whether the United States intended purely to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, and not to act for the defence of El Salvador et al at all.  In addition, later in the judgment, the Court stated that:

If one State…supports and assists armed bands [that attack another State]…that amounts to intervention by the one State in the internal affairs of the other, whether or not the political objective of the State giving such support and assistance is equally farreaching.​[58]​

This too suggests a rejection of subjective factors on the part of the Court.  Admittedly, the Court did not at any point of the Nicaragua merits judgment rule out the relevance of ‘psychological’ factors to self-defence questions in general terms.  Rather, it held that the motives of the United States in the case before it were irrelevant to the decision.  Nonetheless, the fact that the question of whether the United States had acted in self-defence was taken as an objective one lends some support to the view that even an action taken with the intention to act in reprisal could still constitute a lawful action if the criteria for self-defence are objectively met.  

Similarly, the ICJ’s position on this issue may also be inferred from the Oil Platforms decision of 2003.​[59]​  The case concerned two separate sets of attacks on Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf by United States forces, in 1987 and 1988 respectively.  These measures were taken in response to prior attacks against United States flagged vessels in the region.​[60]​  Given the fact that these responses were specifically directed against lucrative oil production facilities, and were taken after the attacks that they were avowedly in response to had abated, it appeared as though the responses taken were at least partially punitive in nature.  Certainly the media at the time of the second set of United States attacks presented the incidents as retaliatory.​[61]​  More importantly, the view that the actions of the United States were at least in part punitive was explicitly taken by a number of judges of the Court.​[62]​  Yet, despite of this feeling within the Peace Palace, the majority judgment on the merits in Oil Platforms did not reference the motives or intentions of the United States at all.  Instead, when examining self-defence, it applied the three criteria of armed attack, necessity and proportionality.​[63]​

It is not merely argued here that an objective approach to the establishment of self-defence is a desirable one, or that it should be accepted because it may be seen to have received some support from the ICJ.  In addition, it should be noted that the view that self-defence is not determined with regard to the ‘psychological’ position of the responding State also appears to correspond to the way that the law is applied in the practice of States.  Not only is this the way that the legal assessment of self-defence should be conducted, but it is the manner in which it is in fact conducted in practice.

This is not to say that the motives – or perhaps, more accurately, the perceived motives – behind a use of force never lead to a negative response from the international community with regard to a claim of self-defence.  However when a State does condemn another due to its perceived motivation or the intentions behind its action, this is better viewed as a response on the political level, rather than on the legal level.  Of course, it is something of a fallacy to argue that there are two distinct ‘levels’ of argumentation employed by States, or that a clear distinction can be drawn between law and politics.​[64]​  Treacherously for the international lawyer, the position taken by a State will often combine legal and political elements.  However, even a somewhat artificial distinction between ‘the political’ and ‘the legal’ has many advantages,​[65]​ and States themselves often do make such a distinction.​[66]​  In this context, it may at least be said that States do not make explicitly legal claims concerning the impact of ‘psychological’ factors on self-defence (something that would be necessary to establish the opinio juris element of any customary criterion of intention or motive).  Moreover, when they do refer to a perceived intention or motive, this is invariably articulated using political language.

For example, in 1958, the Soviet Union violently protested against the interventions, avowedly taken in collective self-defence, of the United States in the Lebanon and the United Kingdom in Jordan.​[67]​  The Soviet Union took the view that these actions were motivated by a desire to protect oil interests: 

The real reason for the armed intervention of the United States in Lebanon is the attempt of the oil monopolies of the United States and of other Western countries to retain their colonial domination in the countries of the Middle and Near East.​[68]​  

Whether this was a correct assessment of the reasons for the intervention or not, it is clear that, for its part, the Soviet Union in no way saw the actions in Lebanon or Jordan as being based upon ‘defensive’ intentions.  Yet, whilst it made this point in the Security Council,​[69]​ it nonetheless was very careful to base its legal denunciation of the interventions on the fact that there had not been an armed attack against either Jordan or the Lebanon.​[70]​  It argued that:

The Charter provides for the right to individual or collective self-defence if there is an armed attack upon a member of the United Nations…[however] nobody has attacked Lebanon and there is not even the threat of armed attack upon Lebanon.​[71]​

As such, the Soviet Union drew an clear distinction between political condemnation based upon perceived impure motives, and legal condemnation based upon the objective rules of self-defence (in this case the criterion of an armed attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter).

In regard to the South African attacks on neighbouring States in 1986, India expressed condemnation, because it perceived that the motivation behind these actions was not to abate African National Congress attacks as was claimed by South Africa, but was instead to intimidate States in the South African sub-continent.​[72]​  A similar point was made by Senegal.​[73]​  Yet, on close inspection, it would appear that this was a purely political conclusion.  These States did not explicitly hold that the South African actions were unlawful, and, even if this view was implicitly held, there is nothing to suggest it was based upon the motive behind the attacks.  Rather, India and Senegal took the view that the perceived motives behind the South African attacks made them, quite simply, wrong.

This distinction between the legal and political may also be seen in the reaction of Sweden to Israel’s intervention at Entebbe airport to liberate its nationals in 1976.  Sweden indicated that it understood and supported Israel’s reasons for the intervention, but that it nonetheless found the action to be unlawful, somewhat reluctantly, on the basis that the threat to nationals abroad could not be considered an armed attack under the meaning of Article 51.​[74]​  Thus, Mr Sundberg, the representative of Sweden, stated in the Security Council that:

The use of force or of military intervention to achieve certain aims, however laudable, is bound to be abused…[yet] my Government, while unable to reconcile the Israeli action with the strict rules of the Charter, does not find it possible to join in a condemnation in this case.​[75]​

Sweden therefore viewed the motives underpinning the Entebbe raid as being enough to render that action politically acceptable, but equally felt that this did not change the fact that it was an unlawful use of force.  This inverted position – that an objectively unlawful action remains unlawful even if its motives are pure – further reinforces the general conclusion that any assessment of self-defence must be based upon the application of objective criteria alone.

States are of course keen to claim that their motives in acting are wholesome ones, but this too invariably takes the form of a political argument.  For example during the Mayaguez incident of 1975, United States Secretary of State Kissenger stressed that the action had no ‘putative intent’ when justifying the operation.​[76]​  Yet, this argument was not framed in a legal manner, and was geared towards promoting the political acceptability of the response.  In any event, the defensive ‘motives’ of the United States in relation to the Mayaguez incident were highly dubious​[77]​ and were questioned at the time by other States.​[78]​

Based on the above examples it is concluded that States do not apply ‘psychological’ factors as legal criteria with regard to self-defence, however politically relevant they may be.  The intentions or motives of the responding State should not be (and are not) taken into account when assessing a claim of self-defence.

IV. The Attacking State: Specific Intent as a Requirement for Armed Attack

In addition to the notion that the subjective position of a State responding in self-defence may influence the lawfulness of that action (distinguishing self-defence from armed reprisals), it has been suggested, notably in the jurisprudence of the ICJ, that a degree of intent on the part of the attacking State must be established before a response may be taken.  As we have seen, the ICJ appeared to suggest – at least implicitly – in Nicaragua and in Oil Platforms, that the underlying motivation behind a response taken in self-defence should not be taken into account when determining whether that response was lawful.​[79]​  However, in a few telling passages, it seems that the ICJ has reached an inverse conclusion with regard to the intention of the attacking State.  Specifically, the Court has indicated that the intention of the attacking State is relevant to the question of whether an armed attack has occurred (and thus the question of whether the State attacked may respond).  Such a suggestion is rather unique: unlike the widespread scholarly acceptance of the relevance of intent or motive of the responding State in determining the lawfulness of self-defence, the intention or motive of the attacking State has not been noted as a possible factor by writers.  Nonetheless, this section examines the notion as it appears in the decisions of the ICJ, and then argues that it is both incorrect and highly undesirable.  To some extent, this is for the same reasons as are set out in the previous section, and as such they are not repeated here.

The implication of the Court is that for an attack to qualify as an ‘armed attack’, it must not only be qualitatively grave, but it must be intended.  There are two possible ways in which ‘intention’ could be applied to an action ostensibly constituting an armed attack.  The first is that the attack must have been intentionally directed against the State invoking self-defence (or the State upon whose behalf the invoking State claims to be acting collectively).  This is roughly equivalent to the idea of ‘specific intent’ in the domestic law of a number of States.​[80]​  The second is a wider criterion; the action must have been an ‘intentional’ one generally.  Here, the perpetrator must have some intent to perform the action at all, in other words to direct it against anyone: this may be termed ‘general intent’.​[81]​  The ‘intention’ requirement alluded to by the Court appears to be the former ‘specific intent’ version.  In other words, we are not considering whether the action was deliberate, but rather whether it was deliberately directed at the responding State.  

The question for the Court, it seems, is whether the attacking State ‘meant’ to attack the responding State.  This can be best illustrated by the 2003 judgment in the Oil Platforms case.  In the context of the first set of United States attacks against the Iranian platforms, paragraph 64 of the Oil Platforms judgment reads:

The Court notes first that the Sea Isle City [a vessel flagged by the United States] was in Kuwaiti waters at the time of the attack on it, and that a Silkworm missile fired from (it is alleged) more than 100 km away could not have been aimed at the specific vessel, but simply programmed to hit some target in Kuwaiti waters. Secondly, the Texaco Caribbean, whatever its ownership, was not flying a United States flag, so that an attack on the vessel is not in itself to be equated with an attack on that State…There is no evidence that the mine laying alleged to have been carried out by the Iran Ajr, at a time when Iran was at war with Iraq, was aimed specifically at the United States; and similarly it has not been established that the mine struck by the Bridgeton [a vessel flagged by the United States] was laid with the specific intention of harming that ship, or other United States vessels.​[82]​

Thus, in Oil Platforms, the ICJ repeatedly indicated that the United States failed to prove that the incidents alleged of Iran were intended to harm the United States.  The implication of this is that if the United States had established that Iran intended to attack it, then these incidents, particularly taken cumulatively, would have amounted to an armed attack.  Or, from the opposite perspective, that the attacks against the United States did not constitute armed attacks because Iran did specifically intend them to be attacks upon the United States.

In a similar vein, in the Nicaragua merits decision of 1986, the Court clearly indicated that it saw the motive behind an attack as being relative to the question of whether that attack constituted an armed attack:

Turning to Honduras and Costa Rica…certain transborder incursions into the territory of those two States, in 1982, 1983 and 1984, were imputable to the Government of Nicaragua.  Very little information is however available to the Court as to the circumstances of these incursions or their possible motivations, which renders it difficult to decide whether they may be treated for legal purposes as amounting, singly or collectively, to an armed attack by Nicaragua on either or both States.​[83]​     

This passage is more general in scope than the quoted paragraph from Oil Platforms.  It does not overtly imply a requirement of ‘specific intent’ to attack the State in question (although it could be interpreted in this manner).  What this passage from Nicaragua does do, however, is further demonstrate that underlying ‘psychological’ factors on the part of the attacking State have been viewed by the ICJ as being relevant to the question of whether an armed attack has occurred. 

Certainly the Oil Platforms decision indicates that the ICJ believed that the specific intent of the perpetrator was relevant to the determination of an armed attack.  Indeed, it has been argued that the Court put this forward as a determinative requirement for lawful self-defence.​[84]​  This would mean that however grave an attack was, it could not constitute an armed attack unless there was specific intent attached to it.  Admittedly, the Court is not this explicit as to the consequence of any lack of specific intent.  Rather, it merely notes that there was not enough evidence to establish such intention on the part of Iran in the context of the case.  An alternative reading of the Court’s position could therefore be that it saw the intention behind an incident as being relative to its qualitative gravity, in terms of determining whether it constitutes an armed attack, but not conclusive.  Under this interpretation, an exceptionally grave, but unintentional attack may still amount to an armed attack.​[85]​  However, there is nothing in the jurisprudence of the Court to suggest that it in any way linked a specific intention criterion to the requirement that an armed attack be particularly ‘grave’.  It is unclear from the judgment as to whether this finding was decisive as to the Court concluding that the incidents were not armed attacks, but this would appear to be the most logical reading of the Oil Platforms judgment.

Thus, the Court’s position in Oil Platforms suggests that ‘indiscriminate’ attacks, or attacks directed at a State other than the responding State, are unlikely to give rise to the right of self-defence.  Prima facie, a restriction of this kind does not appear particularly onerous.  In the vast majority of instances, military force is ‘intentionally’ directed against another State (so far as this can be accepted given the illusory nature of identifying State ‘intention’).  This is certainly true with regard to ‘traditional’ cross-border attacks.  It is difficult to hold that an attack against a State’s territory could be ‘indiscriminate’​[86]​ or directed at a different State. 

However, as the facts of Oil Platforms itself demonstrate, this is not always the case.  Attacks on the high seas, or potentially against third State parties (that damage an embassy or even nationals) may fall into a category of ‘indiscriminate attacks’, or ‘attacks directed at a State other than the responding State’.  A good example of this would be, for example, indiscriminate mine-laying.  It will be recalled that in paragraph 64 of the Oil Platforms decision, quoted above, the Court explicitly referred to the fact that no specific intention could be attached to the alleged mine-laying activities of Iran.

Indiscriminate mine-laying, without subsequent warning, is prohibited under international humanitarian law.​[87]​  This is something that the ICJ itself has noted in both the Corfu Channel case,​[88]​ and in the Nicaragua case, where it was concluded that: ‘if a State lays mines in any waters whatever in which the vessels of another State have rights of access or passage, and fails to give any warning or notification whatsoever…it commits a breach of the principles of humanitarian law.’​[89]​

This leads us to an incongruous situation.  Let us say, for example, that State A lays mines in an international shipping route, and then fails to issue a warning to this effect.  A vessel flying the flag of State B then hits a mine and is destroyed.  The mining of the vessel would clearly constitute a breach of the jus ad bellum: an unlawful use of force.​[90]​  As we have seen, it would also amount to a breach of the jus in bello.  However following the Court’s logic, despite this ‘dual breach’ such an action may not, due to a lack of specific intention, amount to an armed attack giving rise to the right of self-defence.  As such, the above passage from Oil Platforms appears nonsensical: ‘to suggest that such attacks have special immunity from the right of self-defence cannot be correct.’​[91]​  

It can therefore be seen that a requirement of specific intention for armed attack would be an illogical one.  If the intention of the attacking State is relevant to whether it has committed an armed attack, this could preclude a State from responding in self-defence to indiscriminate attacks, even attacks of a high degree of gravity.  Such a position is surely undesirable, as it could potentially encourage States to launch indiscriminate attacks, as no victim would posses a right to respond to them.​[92]​  

In addition to these concerns, one may also reiterate the points made in Section III with regard to the undesirability of referencing ‘psychological’ factors in the context self-defence.  For example, it is almost impossible to ascertain State intention (if indeed such a thing can be seen as existing in the first instance).  There is little need to repeat these arguments here, other than to note that, somewhat obviously, they apply as much to the intention or motive of the attacking State as to that of the responding State.  Again, the clarity and practical applicability of the law governing self-defence would be severely weakened if ‘psychological’ factors of this kind were seen as being legally relevant.





The law on the use of force, and particularly that part of it which governs actions taken in self-defence, is complex and highly controversial.  This is true with regard to the three objective criteria of armed attack, necessity and proportionality.  However, whilst these criteria may be, for the international lawyer, frustratingly flexible and difficult to apply, they are nonetheless based upon empirical factors.  As such, they can be, to a certain extent, objectively assessed.  

In contrast, the intention or motives of the States involved in a forcible dispute are wholly subjective.  Indeed, it may be argued that an abstract entity such as a State may not be capable of possessing a ‘psychological’ position at all.  Even if one accepts that such a thing is indeed possible, it is surely something that cannot be ascertained externally.  At best the intention or motive of a State can be inferred.  However, any attempt to infer a ‘psychological’ position through conduct would be highly impractical, given the variety of factors that inform the State decision making process, especially in the context of the use of force.  

Suggestions in the literature (with regard to the position of the responding State and the distinction between armed reprisals and self-defence) and the judgments of the ICJ (with regard to the position of the attacking State and specific intent) that intent or motive are relevant, will act to further confuse the already complex law in the area.  The distinction between armed reprisals and self-defence is based upon three objective criteria – armed attack, necessity and proportionality – and the definition of an armed attack is purely a question of gravity, not one of specific intent or motivation.
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